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From National to European Regulation: 
Towards European Financial Supervisory Authorities 
H. Onno Ruding 
 
Single Financial Market in Europe 
Financial reform is needed now in the EU not only to 
reduce the likelihood of another financial crisis in the 
coming years but also to reinforce the internal market. 
A primary financial as well as political goal should be 
to create a truly single market in Europe for financial 
services and institutions. The current state of affairs is, 
however, still too far removed from this goal. 
Europe actually faces a financial ‘trilemma’:
1 
consisting of a combination of three elements:  
a)  financial integration, particularly liberalisation of 
financial services; 
b)  stability of the financial system and 
c)  regulation and supervision of financial institutions 
which is still predominantly based on autonomous 
policies and decisions of the individual member 
countries. 
This combination of three crucial elements of financial 
policy goals contains fundamental tensions and 
inconsistencies, and consequently dangers. I consider it 
unavoidable that Europe should change the third 
element by switching from the current, essentially 
national regime of bank regulation and supervision to 
a system with a substantial degree of decision-making 
by European authorities: not only for crisis prevention 
but also for management and resolution of ailing banks 
with a European character: large and active cross-
border. If not, the financial crisis – and even more so, a 
next crisis – may undermine the integrated financial 
market as an essential component of the European 
internal market in general.
2 
Bank Crises and Sovereign Crises 
Europe today is confronted with two major, almost 
simultaneous financial crises: a bank crisis and a 
sovereign crisis related to highly indebted national 
governments. It is true that many private institutions, 
private individuals and governments suffer adverse, 
and frequently cumulative, financial consequences 
from both categories of crises. It may also be true that 
they assume that the causes are the same as well, but 
that would be incorrect. Whereas banks themselves 
carry a fair share of the blame for the financial 
problems many banks find themselves in, this is 
different for the prevailing crises of sovereign debtors. 
Governments, such as Greece, that are having trouble 
staving off default, should blame mainly themselves 
for irresponsible macroeconomic and particularly 
fiscal-budgetary policies followed for years. Banks 
may in some cases have contributed to a sovereign 
crisis by lending too easily, through buying bonds or 
otherwise, but they are not the main culprit. 
However, it is also true that the two categories of 
crises mutually reinforce each other. A sovereign debt 
problem weakens many creditor banks further, both 
domestic and foreign banks. And the cost of bank bail-
outs compounds government deficits and debts. 
Rogoff and Reinhart found in their book on financial 
history
3 “that international banking crises are almost 
invariably followed by sovereign debt crises”. They 
think it is extremely difficult for the eurozone to 
escape this fate. I wonder whether the reverse link is 
applicable as well: sovereign debt crises are almost 
invariably followed by international banking crises. 
The crisis of several Latin American countries and 
No. 209/May 2010 2 | H. Onno Ruding 
subsequently American and European banks in the 
1980s provide an example. The pending drama 
surrounding Greece and perhaps other Southern 
European Euro-area countries may indeed lead to 
another round of bank crisis. 
Priorities for Bank Reform 
One can observe major differences of view with regard 
to the priorities that are needed for bank reform to 
prevent new financial crises – or at least to reduce the 
likelihood of such crises erupting again. 
My own priorities for reform consist of a set of four 
areas of action all of which are indispensable: 
1. Strengthen the capital and liquidity requirements for 
banks to provide a stronger buffer against failure. This 
implies: 
-  increasing the existing capital ratios, particularly 
the minimum ratio of tier I capital to risk weighted 
assets; 
-  improving the quality of bank capital by reducing 
the amounts of ‘hybrid’ forms of capital that 
qualify for minimum tier I capital and by applying 
stricter standards for hybrid capital to qualify; 
-  increasing capital requirements for more risky 
types of bank activities, including for trading 
books; 
-  introducing a new maximum ‘absolute’ or ‘gross’ 
leverage ratio to reduce excessive growth of the 
total balance sheet in relation to core capital – as 
was practiced e.g. by American investment banks; 
and 
-  including off-balance sheet assets and liabilities in 
the calculation of capital adequacy requirements. 
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and 
Regulation is likely to propose changes on a global 
scale broadly along these lines. 
2. Improve the risk management of banks – in addition 
to internal measures by bank management and bank 
(supervisory) boards – by ensuring that bank 
supervisors have sufficient instruments and authority at 
their disposal to induce banks to adopt stricter risk 
management. And also to ensure that supervisors 
actively and even proactively use their instruments and 
authority to prevent banks from putting their continuity 
at risk. 
3. Create in Europe a more European-based system of 
bank regulation and supervision. This should go 
beyond the prevailing coordination of national 
supervision and should create truly European bank 
supervisory authorities. The report of the de Larosière 
Committee provides the essential basis for these 
European authorities. In addition to other valuable 
recommendations the report focuses on two proposals: 
a) to improve macro-prudential supervision: create a 
European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC) to protect 
the stability of the financial system; and 
b) to improve micro-prudential supervision: create a 
European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) to 
protect the solvency and liquidity of individual banks. 
This ESFS will be entrusted a.o. with legally binding 
mediation authority to resolve disputes between 
national bank supervisors. Later, the Regulation 
adopted by ECOFIN gave the ESFS the legal form of 
three “parallel” Authorities, for the three financial 
sectors: “European Banking Authority” (EBA), 
“European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority” (EIOPA) and “European Securities and 
Markets Authority” (ESMA). To my satisfaction the de 
Larosière proposals have been subsequently adopted 
grosso modo – in substance although with regrettable 
weakening of the applicable procedures, such as appeal 
and escape clauses for dissenting member countries –
by the ECOFIN Council of Ministers in December 
2009. These proposals are now being reviewed by the 
European Parliament. I hope that the EP will restore 
the stricter procedures as proposed by the de Larosière 
Committee and subsequently the European 
Commission. 
4. What is now of crucial importance is agreement on 
the necessary next steps beyond the recommendations 
of the de Larosière Committee.
4 My two highest 
priorities for additional European arrangements relate 
to: 
a)  burden-sharing for rescue operations for large, 
cross-border banks and, 
b)  legal provisions to enable a new form (‘third way’) 
of  bank resolution. 
From the four priorities outlined above, one may 
conclude that I do not consider the following official 
measures as appropriate or indispensable for creating a 
solid bank reform: 
1. Imposing forms of new bank taxes (that is: distinct 
from mandatory contributions by banks to deposit 
guaranty funds or schemes), nor 
2. Introducing far-reaching restrictions on the overall 
size and/or type of activities of banks. In other words: 
‘narrow banking’. 
A Third Way: Special Resolution of Ailing 
Banks 
Authorities today have a limited choice when they are 
confronted with a bank close to collapse: either they 
decide to bail-out the bank or to let it fail. The first 
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can be very costly to the national Treasuries and 
therefore the taxpayers. Moreover, it leads to the ‘too-
big-to-fail’ dilemma: both large banks themselves and 
the financial markets as well as the customers-creditors 
of these banks assume – even without any guarantee or 
explicit government commitment to do so – that 
governments will provide them with financial support 
if need be. An informal list of ‘too-big-to-fail’ or 
‘systemic banks’ is being composed by the markets. It 
creates, however, the moral hazard danger. This 
implies that the banks, the financial markets and the 
bank customers all adjust their decisions to the likely 
financial support ‘solution’. Consequently, they 
engage in riskier financial transactions based on the 
principle: “Gains are for me and losses are for the 
taxpayer.” In doing so, they contribute to the next 
financial crisis. The second solution of default and 
“classic” bankruptcy leads to chaos and large losses, 
not only for the bank’s shareholders, bondholders and 
other creditors, but also for the bank’s professional 
counterparties in derivative and trading contracts and 
even for the financial markets in general (see the 
Lehman Brothers collapse). 
Therefore we need to create a ‘third way’: a special or 
enhanced bank resolution mechanism.
5 
It implies official interference, through a ‘resolution 
authority’, in the fate of an ailing bank which is in-
between, on the one hand, no action and bankruptcy 
and, on the other, a bail-out and survival. Its goal is to 
avoid the serious disorder in the financial markets 
when a bank of large, but even of moderate, size 
collapses.  
There are two reasons why the bank resolution 
alternative will substantially reduce the financial 
burden of the government – compared to a traditional 
bail-out. First, the shareholders, the subordinated 
bondholders and probably other creditors – including 
senior bondholders but excluding all guaranteed retail 
depositors – will be ‘wiped out’, that is, they will not 
receive any payment. The second reason is that the 
official authority entrusted with handling the resolution 
can intervene much earlier, ex ante, before insolvency 
occurs in accounting terms, than the bankruptcy court 
in a traditional, ex post bank default.
6 This resolution 
authority may decide to seize the bank when it is still 
functioning, take control and separate or sell certain 
parts or assets of the bank, remove its management, 
freeze the rights of shareholders and creditors and 
reorganize or wind down the bank. It may agree on 
deals with the bank’s counterparties, etcetera. All this 
will reduce the disorder and damage in the financial 
markets and result in an orderly liquidation or merger. 
This solution requires in most countries changes in 
bankruptcy laws to create special legal instruments for 
the bank resolution authority – either a new specialized 
administrative authority or the existing bank 
supervisor, but not the regular bankruptcy court – to 
take measures as described above. This legislation will 
apply to banks only.
7 
This resolution mechanism will to a substantial degree 
take care of the too-big-to-fail dilemma by reducing – 
although not eliminating! – the politically no longer 
acceptable risk of a ‘traditional’ bank bail-out with a 
heavy contribution from the taxpayers. And it also will 
restore market discipline and reduce the moral hazard 
of too-big-to-fail, because it will become much less 
likely that governments will intervene in a ‘systemic 
bank’ failure through a bail-out, thereby allowing 
shareholders and bondholders as well as other creditors 
to escape without (heavy) losses.
8 We should no longer 
distinguish between systemic or too-big-to-fail banks 
and other banks. 
Discipline of Market Forces Failed 
It is generally agreed that a breakdown in responsible 
risk management was a primary cause of the financial 
crisis and that many banks were at the centre of this 
breakdown. Equally, it is widely agreed that the 
financial regulation and supervision in almost all 
countries did not act with sufficient vigour and speed 
to contain this mismanagement of financial 
institutions. Also, the role of the credit rating agencies 
in enabling wrong financial developments to continue 
by erroneously granting their highest ratings to 
fundamentally flawed financial assets or products. 
What, however, is generally less realized is that the 
financial markets and non-bank investors also made a 
substantial contribution by their own inadequate risk 
management. This became evident when many 
investors were willing to buy and hold financial 
instruments where the risk-reward ratio did not reflect 
the fundamentals: this was particularly the case with 
many bonds issued by intrinsically weak borrowers, 
without demanding a sufficiently high interest rate, or 
more precisely, a sufficiently high spread over the 
benchmark interest rate charged to top-quality 
borrowers like German government bonds (‘Bunds’). 
Not only did many investors over time suffer from 
substantial realized or unrealized losses on these 
investments when their market values took large hits, 
but these developments also enabled many borrowers 
to continue their own irresponsible behaviour for far 
too long by financing their own uncreditworthy and 
unsustainable activities for too large amounts at too 
low prices. In other words, if the financial markets 
would have exercised more financial discipline and 
expertise, they would have saved themselves 
substantial losses and they would have prevented the 
financial crisis from exploding so forcefully.
9 
The undisciplined practices of many investors 
manifested themselves in the markets of bonds issued 
by both banks and governments. For several years 4 | H. Onno Ruding 
now, it has surprised me that investors were willing to 
buy bonds issued by structurally weaker governments 
such as Greece, Portugal and Italy at interest rates that 
were very close to the yield on ‘Bunds’. Part of the 
explanation could probably be found in the very high 
ratings given by the credit rating agencies and the high 
credibility that these ratings used to enjoy, and another 
part in the assumption that a member country of the 
euro area – or, to a lesser extent, of the entire EU – 
would, in some form or another, be bailed out by its 
fellow-member countries, even though the European 
treaties do not contain any clause to that effect. 
In academic and banking circles it was advocated for 
many years that banks should issue substantial 
amounts of subordinated bonds. This was based on 
two motives. First, they would contribute to efficient 
capital management for banks to raise – up to the 
maximum amounts permitted by bank regulation – 
‘hybrid capital’, including subordinated bonds, 
preferred shares and certain forms of perpetual bonds. 
They would provide less shareholders’ dilution and 
less expensive capital to banks, after tax, which is after 
deducting the interest charge, than traditional core 
capital: shares or equity. The second advantage was 
supposedly the discipline imposed by the financial 
markets on the banks and their risk management. 
Many professional investors were assumed to be 
sufficiently knowledgeable and critical of the different 
risk profiles of the various banks and the different risk 
profiles of senior and junior, subordinated bonds of the 
same bank. These judgmental differences should be 
reflected in substantial differentials in interest rates on 
the various bonds. Banks with weak or overly 
aggressive risk management or with low capital ratio’s 
would not be able – according to this analysis – to 
attract their target amount of subordinated bonds 
and/or would be forced to pay penalty-level of interest 
rates. These outcomes would negatively affect the 
growth opportunities for this category of banks. In 
reality, however, the market forces did not exercise the 
needed discipline and consequently permitted banks to 
further increase their risk profile and the likelihood of 
failure. The amended Basle rules are likely, and 
correctly so, to curtail sharply the recognition of 
subordinated bonds as tier I-capital. So, the traditional, 
non-convertible subordinated bank bonds will play a 
less important role in the future. 
Very recently a different technique is being tested. In 
essence, it aims at issuing subordinated bonds in the 
capital markets that are accepted by the bank 
regulators, under their new rules now being drafted in 
Basle, as tier I (hybrid) capital because they will be 
mandatorily and automatically converted into common 
shares, and therefore core tier I-capital, in the event 
that the bank’s capital ratio’s fall below a 
predetermined threshold. This compulsory debt-equity 
swap is a fundamental innovation compared to the 
traditional convertible bonds where the holder has an 
option but no obligation to convert later into shares. 
Such a new category of mandatorily convertible bonds 
responds, to a certain extent, to the frequently heard 
criticism that bank bail-outs often lead to bond holders 
being repaid in full, at the expense of taxpayers.
10 
I agree that it would be helpful if banks were to issue 
large amounts of this type of convertible bonds. It 
would lead to contingent capital: an increased capital 
buffer precisely at the time of a threat to the financial 
stability of a bank, thereby reducing the risk of default, 
and it would ensure that unguaranteed or unsecured 
bank creditors would share in any losses in case of 
default, rather than merely the taxpayers and the 
shareholders.
1112 The role of contingent capital would 
be greatly enhanced if bank regulators require banks to 
issue a certain amount of mandatory convertibles. 
However, I doubt whether the capital markets are 
willing to absorb substantial amounts of this type of 
bank bonds for they contain a significant risk of loss of 
value, through a decline in the share price, to its 
holders if the bank in question would find itself in 
rough waters. The only way to make this paper 
sufficiently attractive to (new) investors is through 
offering prohibitively high interest rates.
13 
Too-Big-To-Fail, Narrow Banking and the 
‘Volcker-Rule’ 
At the heart of the debate on bank reform is the dispute 
over whether the fact that a limited number of large, 
complex and interconnected banks (and other financial 
institutions) almost brought down the global financial 
system, should, or should not, lead to a fundamental 
regulatory change by breaking up large banks or 
limiting significantly their permissible activities. Paul 
Volcker is among the strongest proponents of the need 
for this regulatory change to impose narrow banking.
14  
I, on the other hand, share the view of others that such 
a rigorous step is not warranted.
15   
In the discussion about too-big-to-fail and its perceived 
solution of ‘narrow banking’, the Obama-Volcker 
proposal is playing a major role, at least in the USA.
16  
It aims to reduce the activities of regulated banks that 
have access to federal deposit insurance and the 
discount window of the Federal Reserve Bank as 
lender of last resort. Contrary to comments in the 
media, this Obama-Volcker proposal does not imply a 
full return to the era of the Glass Steagall Act of 1933, 
with the strict separation of commercial or deposit or 
retail banks from investment banks. But it does lead to 
a substantial reduction of banking activities that a 
regulated bank is permitted to engage in. In doing so, it 
aims at reducing the risk profile of these banks as well 
as their size, which, in turn, aims at resolving the too-
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I can accept the Obama-Volcker proposal to prohibit 
hedge fund and private equity activities or ownership 
for regulated banks, although these institutions did not 
play an important role in the origins of the financial 
crisis, contrary to populist complaints by politicians 
e.g. in Germany and France. However, their proposal 
to ban proprietary trading in financial instruments is 
ambiguous at best and dangerous at worst. Obama-
Volcker rightly wants to allow regulated banks to 
continue trading to serve their clients: executing orders 
on behalf of clients. But they lump together all other 
trading activities under the heading ‘proprietary 
trading’ which should be banned. The point here is, 
however, that these other trading activities by banks 
consist of two categories. On the one hand, there is 
‘pure’ proprietary trading which banks do entirely at 
their own initiative, with their own capital and at their 
own risk, in order to take positions and make profits. It 
is undeniable that this kind of proprietary trading may 
lead to substantial losses for banks and may therefore 
require curtailment although this was not a major 
factor among the causes of the financial crisis. On the 
other hand, banks also maintain trading books as 
‘market-makers’. A market-maker performs a vital role 
to keep financial markets well-functioning and liquid. 
One cannot serve customers well if one does not 
simultaneously act as a market-maker in the same 
financial products the customer wants to sell or to buy. 
In other words: a ban on market-making activities 
invalidates the license for trading for clients. So, 
financial markets as well as non-financial companies 
need banks to act as market-makers. This latter trading 
activity indeed entails taking positions and taking 
financial risks. However, it should not be forbidden for 
regulated banks. The practical problem, however, is 
that it is very difficult when drafting bank regulation to 
define the borderline between proprietary trading and 
market-making.
17   
On the concept of ‘narrow banking’, I agree that 
official measures are justified to ban a limited number 
of specific activities of regulated banks that are 
perceived to increase disproportionately the risks of 
banking. I even would reluctantly accept a ban on 
‘banc-assurance’ or financial conglomerates. However, 
such a combination of banking and insurance 
activities, as practiced by a limited number of banks, 
was not among the root causes of the financial crisis. 
Consequently I do not consider this mandatory 
separation as an indispensable component of measures 
of bank reform. 
What I do not agree with, is the drive by politicians, 
authors and some financial experts in several countries 
to impose a rigorous set of measures towards narrow 
banking, in the sense of a mandatory limit on the size 
of a bank, i.e. on the size of its balance sheet or its 
revenues.  
My first argument is that smaller does not 
automatically mean less risky for governments and 
taxpayers. I may refer to several recent cases of (near) 
bank failures in Europe as well as the USA that were 
rightly perceived as domestic, and not too-big-to-fail 
banks. Nevertheless, they led to substantial financial 
support operations of the national governments and/or 
deposit guarantee schemes in the home or host 
country: e.g. IKB Bank in Germany, Northern Rock in 
the UK, DSB Bank in The Netherlands, the Icelandic 
banks and Fortis in Belgium-The Netherlands. Also, 
the experience in the USA where in 2009 far more than 
100 regional banks defaulted, undermines the validity 
of the narrow banking preference. Each of these banks 
did not create a costly clean-up operation but all these 
‘small’ interventions by the FDIC in the USA together 
led to an enormous aggregate burden on the FDIC 
which exceeded its entire resources. And this string of 
‘small’ failures continues in 2010. 
Most of the bank failures in recent years are not cases 
like Lehman Brothers but rather small or mid-size 
domestic banks whose losses were not caused by 
excessive leveraging of their balance sheets or large 
trading positions or substantial activities in 
‘innovative’ products such as derivatives and 
securitizations and not even sub-prime mortgages. No, 
their losses came from traditional commercial and 
retail banking activities: unwise risk management in 
extending too much credit to e.g. construction 
companies and real estate firms in their own region or 
to holders of credit cards. Among the worst offenders 
one could cite savings banks in Spain and Germany 
and building societies in the UK. It is therefore an 
illusion to believe that the proposed ‘narrow-banking’ 
solution of separating these two categories of banks 
will eliminate the need to rescue regulated banks.
18  
Moreover, I doubt that governments will always 
successfully resist pressures from financial markets 
and other interested parties to bail-out a large 
unregulated financial institution in the capital markets 
or investment bank category.
19 20 
My second argument is that it is probably more 
effective to reduce the likelihood of bank defaults and 
to address the too-big-to-fail dilemma by focusing on 
different devices: 
a)  let the capital requirements of a bank depend on 
the degree of risk in the balance sheet, the products 
and the revenues of that bank; 
b)  let the bank supervisors become more alert and 
(pro)active, with more appropriate instruments, in 
scrutinizing and, if necessary, curtailing overly 
risky activities of the bank in question. The size of 
a bank may play a role in their assessments of risk; 
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c)  make it more likely that bank shareholders and 
creditors (other than savings accounts insured by 
deposit insurance systems) incur losses in a 
default. 
The result should be that no longer would any bank be 
considered too-big-to-fail and that even a large 
‘systemic’ bank would be allowed to fail, but in a 
different way: less disorderly, with different legal 
instruments, with more elements of market discipline, 
with less distortion of competition (banks deemed 
‘systemically important’ enjoy lower costs of funding), 
with less moral hazard and less cost to society.
21 22 
Bank Taxes 
Confusion and disagreement is emerging globally 
concerning various new taxes to be imposed on banks. 
On the one hand, proposals vary with regard to the 
subjects of any new levies: on certain bank 
transactions (see the old idea of the Tobin-tax) or on 
the overall size of the balance sheet or the profits or 
the revenues of a bank. On this matter international 
coordination is clearly needed to retain a level playing 
field. On the other hand views differ on the use of the 
proceeds of a new bank tax. In some countries 
politicians and others see this as a justified device to 
let banks pay for the losses the financial crisis has 
created for the governments and society at large. 
Although I recognize that this populist approach meets 
much sympathy from politicians, the general public 
and media, I see dubious elements in this motivation. 
First, by far not all banks contributed to the 
deterioration of risk management and the resulting 
losses. Second, one should distinguish between banks 
that received capital injections and various kinds of 
guarantees from the public sector and banks that did 
not need this support. Governments in many countries 
rightly request a tough price for their support by way 
of interest, dividends, premiums and fees and are 
possibly able to sell their temporary stake in a bank’s 
capital at a profit. So, bank taxes on top of all that 
could result in accumulation and overburdening the 
banks.  
Those who favour a form of general bank tax want to 
transfer the proceeds to the general coffers of the 
national Treasury which have been depleted in many 
countries during the financial crisis. Whereas I have 
some sympathy for this goal of covering the cost to 
taxpayers for past bank failures, I become more critical 
if one sees a bank tax as an ‘easy’ way of financing 
large government deficits in general. This is a major 
component of a recent IMF proposal to impose a 
permanent tax on banks.  I become vehemently 
opposed to this approach if – as in the case of the 
recent proposal of the Conservative Party in the UK – 
the motive for a bank tax is the financing of a hobby 
horse of a political party, unrelated to financial crises 
and banks -, like in the British case a tax sweetener for 
the incomes of married couples. 
Some proponents of a bank tax like the IMF believe 
that it would discourage too much risk-taking by 
banks.
23 I doubt that this is realistic. On the contrary, it 
is more likely that banks, faced with declining after-tax 
profitability, try to increase (before tax) profits by 
raising their risk profile, in the hope that more risky 
transactions will stimulate revenues. Imposing higher 
capital requirements on above-average risky bank 
assets makes more sense to discourage excessive risk-
taking. 
Bank Funds 
If it were decided to impose a bank tax, I would favour 
transferring the proceeds – up to a maximum amount, 
to be determined – to a dedicated bank fund or 
financial stability fund. This was the goal of a proposal 
recently being discussed in the US Senate, but which 
was dropped later.  Its goal should be to make funds 
available for the financing of any future official 
support for banks. This could be done on a purely 
national basis. In Europe, however, I would favour a 
European approach in which the banks that are defined 
as large and cross-border, would be handled at the 
European level. Decisions whether or not to save an 
ailing bank in that category and who would finance 
any support, should be made by a European authority. 
The solution of the awkward problem of international 
governmental burden-sharing of bank rescues can be 
facilitated by transferring a portion of the proceeds of a 
bank tax to the above-mentioned fund. 
European Commissioner Michel Barnier recently 
spoke in favour of a European ‘emergency’ fund for 
future bank rescues to be financed by bank 
contributions (either bank taxes or annual insurance 
premiums).
24  This idea is linked to proposals to adapt 
the existing national deposit guarantee systems or 
funds. Their functioning varies from country to 
country but in most cases the goal is to provide 
financial protection to retail customers, with savings 
accounts, of banks that are bankrupt. Here too, it 
makes sense to separate domestic banks from large 
cross-border banks and to create a new guarantee fund 
for the latter category only. The banks in that category 
will be obliged by law or European directive to make 
annual,  ex ante contributions in cash into such a 
European fund, according to both its size and its risk 
profile.  Ex ante contributions form a crucial and 
welcome disciplinary element: banks with high-risk 
profiles will disproportionately contribute to the 
deposit guarantee system. If later one of these large 
‘European’ banks would encounter serious problems 
this bank fund could be used – to be determined on a 
case-by-case basis – either for a bail-out of that bank to 
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depositors – of course to a pre-agreed maximum 
amount per account – in cases where it is decided to let 
the bank in question to go under. 
I want to emphasize two essential points. The first is 
the need to make sure that any future bank problem – 
both a default with a bail-out of its depositors and a 
rescue to avoid a default with a bail-out of the bank 
itself through capital injections – can be financed in 
the first instance by the private sector itself. The 
resources of the above-mentioned bank guarantee 
fund, or bank resolution fund, provide the first and 
hopefully only source of finance for any bank support 
action. A serious problem arises, obviously, if the 
resources of the fund are not large enough to finance 
one or more problem cases of very large banks. In such 
an awkward situation, the relevant European authority 
may decide to tap the above-mentioned official bank 
fund to finance any residual losses. This should be a 
fall-back option only and implies a combined private-
public financing of failed banks. Dominique Strauss-
Kahn of the IMF has made similar proposals.
25 
The advantage of this approach is that the official 
sector would have already obtained a substantial 
amount available in its bank fund for rescues of a bank 
or its depositors, without encountering the notorious 
need to find ad hoc – on the spur of the moment and in 
the midst of a bank crisis – new financial resources 
from one or more national Treasuries. In this way one 
may avoid or reduce the awkward burden-sharing 
dilemma. 
This brings me again to the concerns of moral hazard: 
when private sector institutions assume or expect that 
they will be bailed-out and stay alive through financial 
support from the public sector. The presence of a fund 
with public money earmarked for future bank rescues 
may indeed increase this moral hazard with the 
corresponding danger of irresponsible, excessively 
risky behaviour of a bank.
26 There are, however, two 
counter-arguments. First, banks know that their own, 
private sector money will act as the first buffer to 
finance any support action. And second and more 
importantly, the moral hazard issue will diminish if the 
special ‘resolution’ alternative will be introduced to 
address a bank failure. The major feature of this 
alternative solution is that an endangered bank will not 
be kept alive and not bailed-out with public money and 
that shareholders and creditors will suffer losses. 
Consequently, the moral hazard issue will become less 
threatening as well. 
This analysis makes it clear that there is a risk of 
confusion about the basic character of ‘bank funds’ in 
the current debate.
27 For some, a bank fund should 
merely retain the current goal of most private sector-
funded deposit guarantee systems (DGS), namely to 
compensate retail bank customers/depositors after a 
bank has defaulted and stopped operations.
 They want 
to introduce a European DGS.
28 Others support this 
approach but want to expand its scope of action to 
include – as mentioned above – funding of official 
interventions before a bank has defaulted, based on the 
special bank resolution mechanism. This latter type of 
support would fundamentally change the character of a 
DGS. 
Dilemmas for Banking Reform 
We face several dilemmas in choosing the optimal way 
forward towards reforming the banking sector. In 
addition to the ones already mentioned such as the lack 
of burden sharing, the moral hazard and the too-big-to-
fail issues I want to highlight several others. 
First, some prefer to focus on measures to punish the 
banking sector for all the evil it has brought to the 
world in recent years by restricting bonuses, imposing 
new taxes on banks and restricting the size of banks 
and the activities they are allowed to engage in. Others 
are more forward-looking and emphasize measures 
that will reduce the possibilities for new financial 
crises to occur. Those two approaches are not 
necessarily contradictory and the practical political 
outcome may be a combination of elements of both. 
Second, this reference to a combination of official 
measures leads to another dilemma. I am afraid that the 
outcome will be a variety of reforms each of which by 
itself may make sense to address the causes – or the 
consequences! – of the financial crisis but which result 
in an accumulation of restrictive measures for banks. 
This in turn may reduce significantly the activities, 
revenues and profits of most banks. In particular, a 
combination of imposing ‘narrow banking’, including 
a forced reduction of the maximum size of banks 
and/or a ban on certain profitable banking products and 
a substantial increase in the minimum capital 
requirements for banks plus a new and additional 
‘bank tax’, is likely to lead to a significant reduction in 
the ability and willingness of many banks to extend 
new credits to their customers, both retail and 
corporate. This will negatively affect economic 
growth. Politicians who are now advocating such an 
accumulation of measures but who later will criticize 
the banks for the reduced availability of credit for 
mortgages, trade finance, new corporate investments 
etcetera should heed this warning. Another danger is 
that a victory for those who favour a banking tax may 
weaken the support for the tough capital and liquidity 
rules being considered by the Basle Committee. I share 
the concerns expressed by its President Nout Wellink
29 
that these tax proposals “might be a hindrance” to 
regulatory efforts to make the financial system safer 
and more stable by toughening capital and liquidity 
rules. He rightly urges politicians to wait until his 
committee has finalized their plans.
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Third, there is fair chance that decisions to change 
bank regulation and supervision, to change capital 
requirements, to impose new taxes etcetera will result 
in an outcome that differs substantially between the 
USA and Europe, and perhaps other areas as well. 
Even if each of these final results may be acceptable in 
its own right, the divergence is not acceptable if it 
creates an uneven playing field. The absence of equal – 
or at least comparable – conditions will imply 
distortion of competition and banks will engage in 
‘arbitrage’ to carry out activities in the country that is 
relatively the most attractive one. 
Fourth, at the present juncture I see two dangers 
emerging with regard to bank reforms. At the one 
extreme, the danger exists of a weakening of the drive 
towards serious bank reform. This weakening is caused 
partly by an (incorrect) feeling that the need for action 
has diminished now that the worst of the financial and 
economic crisis is over, partly by resistance from the 
banking sector supported by their strong lobbying 
efforts and partly by differences of views among the 
reformers over what precisely should be done, both 
within countries and internationally. This applies both 
to the USA and Europe. 
At the other extreme, the danger is looming of 
excessive and overlapping regulation, with too many 
new measures that may stifle a sound functioning of 
the banking sector and consequently the growth 
prospects for the entire economy. Which one of the 
two – contradictory – developments will prevail is 
difficult to predict. I am afraid it may be a mixture of 
both. 
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